Virus Writing Techniques

How lessons from the past can help us change the direction of the malware arms race.

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My Background

CS Undergrad

Past Intern



LOCKHEED MARTIN

Future Intern



Cyber Security Scholar



Information Trust

Undergrad RA

Center for Simulation of Advanced Rockets




University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaigno

The Next 45 Minutes

- Motivation
- Virus Writing 101
- New Tools!
- Evading AV (Demo)
- Wrap up

Motivation

Hate Chart



What's the Problem?


- AV marketing prevents average customers from making informed choices.
- Signatures are a Cold War approach to fighting malware.
- The is no "full disclosure" for AV.

AV Marketing

Bullets and Viruses: Serious Business



(C)2009 Daniel Austin Hoherd



http://www.flickr.com/photos/warzauwynn/4191357929/

http://www.flickr.com/photos/ringai/3911794367/


Protection: Body Armor and AV

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Body armor (chalecos blindados, chaleco antbalas)comes in all sorts of shapes and designs to fit your individual requirements and the level of protection you need. To understand the level of protection please refer to the bulletproof chart which details bullet calibers, speed per second etc.

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AVG Internet Security 9.0

Complete protection for everything you do

We know when you go online you want to be able to surf, s shop safely. With AVG Internet Security, our most advance worry-free online experience every time. Internet Security's

Protection: Body Armor and AV Part 2

Protection: Body Armor and AV Part 2

56



No one bullet resistant vest works for everyone. There are a number of issues to consider when selecting body armor:

- 1. Ballistic resistance materials
- 2. Threat levels
- 3. Vest type (concealable vs. tactical body armor)

The information below will guide you in the process for choosing the right armor protection for your needs. For specific information, please visit one of

http://www.bodyarmor.com/

Protection: Body Armor and AV Part 2

SE



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 Total Protection Advanced Service
O 1 Year Subscription (from \$59.85 / License)
O 2 Year Subscription
Complete Desktop Protection Website Protection
Risk and Compliance
Email Protection

http://shop.mcafee.com/Products/TotalProtectionForSmallBusinessAdvanced.aspx

http://www.bodyarmor.com/

This Is A Market Failure

If customers can't understand the merits of products, the best product will not win.

Lessons From The Cold War

Cold War: Build More Missiles







http://www.flickr.com/photos/wallyg/3685388901/

Growth of Malware: 2002-2008




Figure 3. New malicious code threats Source: Symantec

http://www.symantec.com/connect/sites/default/files/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf






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Cold War: How Did They Fix It?



http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/Reagan_and_Gorbachev_hold_discussions.jpg

Failed Solution: "Star Wars"



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sdilogo.svg

Successful Solution: INF



How Can We Adjust Our AV Approach?

Failed Solution: Malware Signatures

- One-for-one approach never works.
- The defensive tech is an order of magnitude harder than offensive tech.
- Historical track record of failure.

McAfee Incident


At 11 AM today, 4/21, McAfee released an update to its customers that improperly identified a critical component of Windows as having a virus."

McAfee Incident

"Roughly 800,000 PCs ... are not experiences repetitive reboots."

McAfee Incident

 "NOTE: Your computer does not have a virus, but McAfee VirusScan incorrectly believes it does."



New (Old?) Solution: Full Disclosure

- In part responsible for the gains in network and OS security since the 90's.
- Vendors can't afford to employ enough people, must involve public.
- In turn, vendors are held accountable.

Involving the Community Works

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🗄 🖂 🛱 Ramos, Rohit (2)	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] Nmap5 cheatsheet - Well, the Spanish translation is nice, but what does the English version I
🗄 🗖 😭 Kotas, Kevin J (2)	Full Disclosure Bugtrag [Full-disclosure] CA20100222-01: Security Notice for CA Service Desk - BEGIN PGP SIGNED MES
🗄 🗖 🖄 Karn Ganeshen	Full Disclosure Re: [Full-disclosure] Oracle eBusiness Suite 11i - Cross Site Scripting - All Parameters - Hi, Specific to 11i, I h
🗄 🗖 😭 Jonathan T (13)	Full Disclosure Re: [Full-disclosure] Why - Kafka's The *Trial. My sincere apologies. On Mon, Feb 22, 2010 at 12:51 PM, T Bi
🗄 🖂 🖄 Marc Deslauriers	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] [USN-902-1] Pidgin vulnerabilities - Ubuntu Security Notice USN-902-1 February 22, 2010 pi
ii 🖂 🖄 Major Malfunction	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] London DEFCON February meet - DC4420 - Wed 24th Feb 2010 - I think we can safely say 1
🗄 🖂 🖄 Stephan Gerling	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] Some nice code yust captured - Dear all, I just get a information by a scared user about some
🗄 🗖 🎲 John Adam (6)	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] How I become Vice President of Security at Yahoo! 1999-2005 Let us not forget that this is
ii 🗆 😭 Ofer Maor (2)	Full Disclosure Bugtrag [Full-disclosure] Hacktics Advisory Feb10: Persistent XSS in Microsoft SharePoint Portal - Hacktics
E SEC Consult Research	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] SEC Consult SA-20100208-0 :: Backdoor and Vulnerabilities in Xerox Wo SEC Consult Se
ii 🗆 🖄 Roberto Suggi Liverani (2)	Full Disclosure Bugtrag [Full-disclosure] Multiple Adobe Products - XML External Entity And XML Injection Vulne,) .`),)
ii 🖂 🖄 Georgi, Jeff, Pavel (3)	Full Disclosure [Full-disclosure] help fuzzing/finding Horn CNF formula - On Fri, 19 Feb 2010, Georgi Guninski wrote: > i am I
ii 🖂 🛱 Fernando Gont (2)	Full Disclosure Bugtrag [Full-disclosure] Request for feedback on TCP security (IETF effort) - Hello, folks, I've just posted a r
ii 🗆 🗇 security (2)	Full Disclosure Bugtrag [Full-disclosure] [MDVSA-2010:044] mysql - BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE Hash: SHA1

There's No Public Red Team for AV!

- We have cryptanalysts.
- We have penetration testers.
- We have public disclosure of vulns.
- We DON'T have anything public for AV.

FD Implementation?

- Security community needs to help AV vendors.
- Produce open source tools to evaluate the effectiveness of existing AV.
- Good guys need to study virus writing techniques and publish results.

Virus Writing 101

Clumsy Evasion

Encryption

- Anti-disassembly/Anti-debugging
- Virtualization detection
- Anti-anti-virus

Elegant Evasion

- Metamorphic techniques
- Binary -> Intermediate Representation (IR)
- Add/subtract from IR
- Perform transformations on IR
- ► IR -> Binary

Why It's Scary

- Takes some expertise to implement, but very difficult to detect.
- "Theoretically" accurate signatures are impossible.
- Bonus prize: better cross platform support than your average enterprise application!

Tools

Introducing Parable: A Tool To Help The Development of AV

Overview

- Based on Alessandro Warth's OMeta.
- Parser/transformer for assembly (currently only x86).
- Can be extended in an OO way.
- Extremely fast and flexible development.

Parser/Transformer

- Takes ASCII assembly in, writes ASCII assembly out.
- Disassembly and assembly of binaries are scripted.
- Transformations written in Ruby!

Extending With OO

Parsing: random garbage instruction

```
meta x86++ <: x86 {
stmt ::= <space>* 'rand_garbage' => ...
| <super stmt>;
```

Extending With OO

Parsing: pluggable code modules

```
meta x86++ <: x86 {
stmt ::= <space>* 'encrypt_func' => ...
| <super stmt>;
```

Extending With OO

Transformation: pluggable code modules

Current Capabilities

- Entry point obscuring.
- Instruction and method permutation.
- Attempt at data structure permutation and mimicking system binaries.

Demo

Caveats

- Not a true metamorphic engine.
- Could be implemented in C/x86....
- Ruby implementation deters plug and play script kiddies.

Caveats II

- Complete evasion is not the goal.
- Just need to make signature based detection completely impractical.
- Provide a testbed for experimentation for AV vendors and security professionals.

Wrapping Up

Related Tool: SLIPFEST

- SLIPFEST (<u>http://slipfest.cro.org/</u>)
- HIPS Evaluation, similar motivation
- Difference: AV isn't a strict target

Related Tool: Metasm

- Metasm (<u>http://metasm.cro.org/</u>)
- Binary file manipulation
- Pure Ruby!
- Difference: Parable focuses on rapid development and offensive testing.

Final Thoughts

- Security community at large can help make AV stronger.
- We need to adopt the same standards for AV that we have in every other area.

Thanks!

http://www.timsally.com/talks/ thotcon0x1.html

Code, slides, notes, links, papers, etc!